3: Anonymous U-4 (no date) 1920 RH1 Caucasia RH1

(population in 1913, 237,000). Other important towns are *Novorossiisk* (66,700), *Elisavetopol* (63,400 in 1910), *Kutais* (53,900), *Batum* (46,000), and *Erivan* (34,000). For further particulars concerning these see below, pp. 42 and 77.

Movement

Recent statistics are not available, but the annual rate of increase can be roughly estimated at 60,000. It is probable that the Armenians increase at a more rapid rate than the other nationalities in Transcaucasia. The death-rate, particularly among children, is certainly high; for this the unhealthy climate in the west, the rigorous winters in the east and central parts, and the ignorance of the natives are responsible.

Accurate statistics of emigration are not available. Since the great migration of the Cherkess (to Anatolia) and other Mohammedan tribes (to Turkey), which depopulated much of the western coast in the latter half of the nineteenth century, emigration has tended to be spasmodic. A certain number of Armenians emigrate to America. Many tribes still live what is practically a nomadic life; and for those who are not too proud to do manual labour the towns form a continual attraction.

Immigrants are largely Russians, both official and non-official. The latter come very largely from South Russia and settle in the central governments or, for industrial purposes, at Baku. There is a small annual influx of foreigners, but not to the same extent as in Ciscaucasia. Periodically there have been Armenian immigrations from Turkish Armenia, though these have lately been regarded unfavourably by the Government.

CISCAUCASIA

(1) Position and Frontiers

Ciscaucasia, a district of European Russia, is the northern part of the region of Caucasia. It is bounded on the west by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov;

3: Anonymous U-4 (no date) 1920 RH1 Caucasia RH1

for industrial work; many of them, especially those of the mountainous districts, are very backward (as are also the Kurds and Ossetes), but the Lesghians and Gruzians are reliable and hard-working, and constitute the best native labour supply. The Armenians, on the other hand, find their most congenial employment in trade and usury, though a good many of them are employed on the oil-fields; the Russian colonists make good agriculturists, but are often idle and intemperate; while the Tatars, who in general are farmers and breeders of sheep and cattle, are also the predominant element on the Baku oil-fields.

The native labour supply, however, is insufficient for the country's requirements on the oil-fields and elsewhere, and there has been a considerable *immigration* for some years past, the chief sources being as follows:

(i) *Russian.* — When Transcaucasia came under Russian rule in 1878, the State replaced the many Abkhasians and Circassians who left the country by considerable numbers of Russian colonists. Russian settlers have been planted by the State on the reclaimed lands of the Mughan and Mil steppes. There is a seasonal movement of some 300,000 labourers from Central Russia into Ciscaucasia for the harvest. *Artels*, or combines of Russian skilled workers, numbering from 10 to 50 persons, move about the country undertaking various sorts of contract work, and earn high wages.

(ii) *Armenian.*—Except in the two or three years following the establishment of the Young Turk Government, there has been a steady stream of immigration from Turkish Armenia to the Caucasus. This immigration increased during the persecution of the Armenians in 1915, but the fate of the refugees since the Turco-German occupation of the Caucasus is uncertain. Echmiadzin, in the Government of Erivan, the residence of the Armenian Patriarch, was regarded as the national capital of the Armenians.

(iii) *Turkish* labour is imported for the tea plantations on the Black Sea coast, and for the copper mines in the Batum district.

3: Anonymous U-4 (no date) 1920 RH1 Caucasia RH1

464 (iv) *Persians* go to the Baku oil-fields as tub-cleaners,
167&c.

(v) Induced by the demand for labour on railway construction and other public works, a considerable number of *Italians* immigrated into Transcaucasia about the middle of last century, and remained there in scattered communities. There is also a small seasonal immigration of Italians, chiefly masons, road-makers, and sculptors, which increases whenever new public works are taken in hand.

(vi) A few *Greeks* enter Caucasia, mainly to work in the copper mines.

(vii) There are a few villages inhabited by *German* immigrants of long standing, representing, as in Hungary, early German efforts at colonization.

167 There has been no *emigration* worth mention since the beginning of the present century, except that in 1910 a number of Turkish Armenians returned to their native country, hoping that the Young Turk revolution would secure better political conditions for their race.

(*b*) *Labour Conditions*

466 Since the revolutionary disturbances at Baku in 1902–5 (see above, p. 29) the conditions of labour in the Caucasus have steadily improved, in spite of the difficulties placed in the way of labour organization
468 by the diversity of nationalities involved. There have been frequent strikes. In 1913 manganese miners, case and can factory hands, copper miners at Dzansul, dock labourers at Poti, and the employees of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company struck for shorter hours, increased pay, and better housing. These movements met with varying degrees of success; an average advance of 30 per cent. in the rate of wages was effected and an eight-hours day was generally conceded. In May 1914 there was a general strike on the Baku fields, the demands including recognition of workmen's committees, better conditions both in the workshops and in the workers'

103 Caucasians also call the Pontos the "Black Sea" (Georgian Šavi Zγva).

Later, in Arabic and Persian geographical and historical literature, forms of the name of these mountains such as Qabaq, Qabuq (?) appear, and a similar form Qāf or Qāp, becomes the general term for the Caucasus throughout the Near and Middle Eastern Islamic world (in Turkic Qāf daγlary, etc.), forms which have some slightly remote relationship with the old Iranian and Western term.

181 For a long time the Caucasus was, and
132 in a certain sense still is, a great divide between two rather different worlds: on the one hand, Trans-Caucasia, which is culturally Mediterranean and Near Eastern, and climatically arid and sub-tropical; and on the other, the North-Caucasian plains, a cultural no-man's land, the transitory roaming-grounds of nomadic peoples, and climatically belonging to the continental zone of the vast East European plains. The steppes of the northern
133 Caucasian triangle between Don-Volga and the
• 167 Caucasus have been, down to the last two centuries, the battlefields between ever-changing nomadic conquest groups, arriving one after the other in an almost unending sequence out of the high plains of Central and Eastern Asia, trying to force their way into the territories of the Persian or the Roman Empires, which had their outer defenses established in these plains. But even prior to those movements,

133 which start with the Great Migrations, and
•167 during which, time and again, conquering peoples forced their way around or even through the Caucasus Mountains, the North Caucasian steppes and Caucasian lands were the scene of movements of entire nations or of organized armies of one or the other of early Mediterranean or Near Eastern empires. But they found the huge range an insurmountable barrier closing off the entire isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea from one end to the other. And it proved very difficult to circumvent this huge natural fortificatory wall because of the narrow passage between mountains and seashore. While the west coast offers the greatest obstacles, the east coast has on its longer extent, along the mountains fanning out towards the northern Caspian basin, a slightly larger strip of land which would serve as a pathway--with only one narrow spot where the fortress of Derbent (Darubanda in Georgian, from Old-Iranian Daru-banda, "door-band" or "closed doors") is situated, built at a very early epoch.

144 The Caucasus is not only a divide but a refuge as well for ethnic groups which have succumbed to pressure, and have had to retreat from large valleys or plains where they were being attacked or gradually displaced and finally doomed either to extinction or flight. Like the Alps, the Elburz, the Hindukush, or Himalaya Mountains, the Caucasus shelters relic peoples from groups which a

7:Columbia U. S-4, 5 1956 RHI Caucasia
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ETHNOLOGICAL AREAS

Russians and Ukrainians; Cossacks; Turks

162 The different geographical landscapes which may be distinguished in the Caucasus -- the North Caucasian plains, the high mountain regions of the Great Caucasus and its valleys, the large Trans-Caucasian valley, and the Anti-Caucasus with its high plateaus extending behind it--do not coincide with the ethnological provinces of the entire area. The watershed on the Stavropol' plateau, constituting a climatic borderline, has also become an ethnological frontier which, however, has been effaced in the south of the plateau; west of it, Russians and Ukrainians, east of it Turkic-speaking peoples, most of them being Noghai. The reason for this, as we saw, was the pattern of expansion of the Russian and Ukrainian peasant settlers, who have not gone far into the steppes east of the Stavropol' watershed. In this arid zone agriculture is not possible without irrigation, whereas peoples living in a nomadic state and having a pastoral economy find the steppes adequate living grounds, provided that there is enough space for their needs, and that the area is not undergoing increasing desiccation. The 162 169 Russian immigrants have taken possession of the entire northwestern part of the Great Caucasus, which is now under Russian occupation up to the upper course of the Kuban. The area of the source rivers of the Kuban was peopled

162
167 by the Turkic Karachai until 1943 or 1944, when this land was given to the Svans and Mingrelians. From that point northwestward, the entire Great Caucasus is Russian and, in the lower regions approaching the Azov Sea, Ukrainian. Only a few remnants of the ancient inhabitants are left along the upper and central course of the Kuban: these are principally the Kabarda-Cherkess (Circassians) on the upper course, and the Adyghe-Cherkess farther down the river. On and near the upper Kuban, a few Noghai groups now live in villages. The above-mentioned Cherkess are the remnants of the Northwestern Cherkess, most of whose member-groups, the Bzhedukh, Ubykh, Abadzekh and Shapsug emigrated in 1865 and subsequent years to Turkey, for the most part. Many of those who remained have already been absorbed by the Russians. The Russian conquest started on a fairly large scale with the reign of Peter I, when the Russian Cossacks (kazaki, kozaki) began to appear in the North Caucasian plains at the same time as the campaigns were being waged against these far-flung outposts of the Osman Empire and its vassal state, the Khanate of the Crimea.

These Cossacks were coloni sui generis, who laid the foundations for the political and ethnical conquest and a not always

162
167 peaceful agricultural penetration of these regions. They settled in stanitsy, "Cossack or warrior villages" (this term would better be translated by "posts"), a number of which, toward the end of the last century, often had 10,000-15,000 inhabitants each. These people had the peculiar double occupation of peasant and soldier.

The Great-Russian population has occupied the entire southern portion of the Stavropol plateau, the upper Kuma and its upper tributaries as far as the Malka and the T'erek, following the latter to the estuary from where it continues northward along the Caspian shore right to the Volga delta and Astrakhan. It has separated to a large extent the steppe peoples from the Caucasians proper, or the mountaineers (Russian: gortsy; Turkic: ta ly, taulu, or da lu), as they are often called. In the large "Bay of Vladikavkaz", the Russians have penetrated south of the T'erek line, and even across the Sundja river, driving a few wedges into the original population there; this expansion is carried out by occupying first the river banks. (The same method is seen, by the way, in the Russian conquest of Siberia; in the latter case geographical reasons were the motivation.) Thus, the Kabarda has been split up into two major regional groups, a larger, western and a smaller, eastern one; the Cherkess into three, a small western, a northern one along the southern banks of the

162 central T'erek, and a larger southern one
167 along the tributaries of the Sundja. Along the T'erek, below Vladikavkaz, the Oset'is have been split in a similar way, and many more examples could be adduced here. During the most hectic years of Stalin's absolutism, the bigger towns and cities having industrial enterprises were filled with Russians sent there as workers and specialists of all kinds, often only as specialists in national coercion in the event of war. In the Northwest and [127] North Caucasian area, the people finally showed such an overwhelming enthusiasm for Hitler and his victorious "supermen" that entire nations, and not surprisingly quite a number of Russians with them, went over to the Nazi side, even before the spearheads of the German armies had reached them. Thus later on, after Hitler's defeat at Stalingrad, their defection had the well-known consequences: the "culprit nations" were punished in true Stalinist fashion, with the result that the ethnic map of the area was changed to a considerable degree.

Russian peasant villages were found even in the Anti-Caucasus; most of them are scattered all over the northern part of the area, mainly in valleys of the northern border mountains. But single Russian villages can be found as far as the two provinces of Kars and Ardahan, where the Russian population seems to have remained after their reannexation by Turkey, as suggested by a few place names.

177 even military convoys. By diverting these people to agriculture, order was finally established, resistance on any sort of wide or dangerous level was broken; thus the conditions for the ultimate incorporation of those national groups into the large Russian family were created.

167 174 Since Caucasian studies are still very much in an incipient stage, it is not possible to trace the different waves in which the historical and present-day Caucasian peoples came to their habitats. Where historical sources are missing, the chief help comes from linguistics.

The Eastern Slavs, coming from the north, were the last wave of immigrants and conquerors (18th to 20th centuries). They were preceded by the Turkic-speaking peoples (11th-14th centuries), who in turn came later than the Alanoi-Aorsoi, the forebears of the Oset'i (1st-3rd centuries A. D.). Events prior to that time are unclear. It is impossible to say whether groups of the Skythai, or Sauromatai (6th-1st centuries B. C.) went to the Caucasus, though this might be indicated by a remark of Strabon's (Book XI. chapter 3). And with this, we are in pre-Christian times.

In the south, history goes much farther back, but only insofar as it deals with one of the ancient Semitic or Anatolian (Hittite, etc.) cultures. Therefore, there are enormous gaps for the Caucasus proper, and the peoples who migrated there from the south. The campaigns of Alexander the Great bypassed the Caucasus,

so that direct historical information is lacking about this period as well as all the preceding centuries. But during those times, the present-day and historically-known Trans-Caucasian peoples had already been in the area for a long time. Thus, we can distinguish five historical waves: 1) the Russian; 2) the Turkic, coming from Turkestan and Central Asia via Iran; those were the so-called Oghuz Turks, from whom the Saldjuqs, the Osmans, and the Azerbaidjanians stem; 3) the Arabic, less an ethnic than a political wave, like the Mongolians in the 1220s; 4) the Iranian, probably consisting of different phases which, if named after political units, could be called Sasanian, Akhaemenian and pre-Akhaemenian; 5) that of the Indo-European Armenians (Hajk), who superseded the Proto-Armenians, at least a strong group of whom descended from Urartu. This early fifth wave occurred at a time when the K'art'velians, or at least Proto-K'art'velians, had long since been at home in the regions they occupy today, the southwestern triangle of Trans-Caucasia, called by Strabon
("country of the Moskhoi," the Meshekh [Masak] of the Old Testament). At this early Proto-Armenian period, in the early centuries of the second millenium B. C., the ancestors of many of the northwestern and northeastern Caucasian peoples were already living in, or at least near, their present-day dwelling places--perhaps not in the inaccessible, high alpine valleys of the Caucasus, but in the

167
174 fertile plains at the foot of the mountains. But the periods referred to above as those of the 4th and 5th waves, present us with an enormous number of riddles which can only be tackled (if they ever are) with the help of linguistics and archaeology.

7: Columbia U. S-4,5 1956 RH1 Caucasia RH1
Adige
Kabardin

101 rivers Malka, Baksan, Cherek and Upper Terek (Kabardian ASSR); between the Upper Kuban and Zelenchuk rivers (Cherkes AO) and south of the middle course of the Kuban and in the basins of the Laba and Belaya. Smaller groups are scattered in the whole N. W. Caucasus, between and around these concentrations.

[167] The Circassians, now numbering a little over 250,000, were much more numerous before the Russian conquest which caused 3-500,000 of them to emigrate to Turkey. Their self-designation "Adyghe" was first recorded by the Genoese Georgio Interiano (first half of 16th cent.); the Kievan chronicle knows them as Kasogy (and in Ossete the Kabardians are still called Käsäg). Strabo knew in the N.W. Caucasus the Zygoi (other forms: Zikchoi, Zinchoi), a name which may reflect the Circassian word ts'ykhw meaning "human being." The connection of the name "Circassian" (from Ital. Circassi, cf. Turkish, Russian, etc. cherkes) with the ancient Kerketai known already to Hellanikos (5th cent. B.C.) is doubtful.

The Eastern (or Upper) Circassians (in the territory of the present Kabardian ASSR) are known as Kabardians; these were the most numerous and the most warlike of all the Circassian tribes. Of all the N. Caucasian peoples their society developed the most pronounced feudal traits; in the 15-18 centuries they

7: Columbia U. S-4,5 1956 RH1 Caucasia RH1• Dagestan RH8

C D 101 197 people living in the village Zemo Alvani on the Kakhetian Alazani, among the Georgian mountain tribe of the Tush (therefore they were formerly erroneously called Tsova-Tush), and a number of tribes whose dialects show common innovations as compared to C D Bats. Some are nearly extinct, e.g. that of •[16] the Karabulak who by 1870 had almost all emigrated to Turkey. The remaining dialects fall into two groups, the Chechen and the Ingush, numbering respectively ca. 408,000 and 92,000 who until 1944 lived between the middle course of the Terek and the Great Caucasus in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. All Chechen call themselves Nakhchuo (pl. Nokhchiy); the name Chechen came up in the 17th century among the Russians, who applied the name of one aul (Chachan) to the whole people. The older history of the Veinakh peoples is quite unknown; they lived in self-governing communities and had not developed any class distinctions when the Russians came into contact with them. In 1944, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was abolished and its population deported to Kazakhstan, where it has since received some official recognition (1955) by the issuing of a Chechen language newspaper.

b. The peoples speaking Avaro-Ando-Didoic languages occupy the western part of

162 101 on the Stavropol' upland (southward from the Manych canal) and between the Kuma and Yegorlyk rivers. The main concentration of the Turcomans is in the southwestern part of Central Asia (Turkmen SSR ca. 800,000, [167] Northern Iran over 500,000); the Turcomans immigrated to the Northern Caucasus comparatively recently from the Mangyshlak peninsula.

(c.) The Kumuk (ca. 95,000) live on the northeastern slopes of the Great Caucasus along the Aksai, Sulak, Shura and Cubden rivers and along the Caspian coast from Adzhi-su to Derbent. The date of their arrival in their present habitat is unknown; they have been there at least since the sixteenth century. The Kumuk have been vassals of Russia since the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but continued to be governed by their own rulers called shamkhals until 1867.

(d.) The more than 40,000 Noghay in the Northern Caucasus (their exact number is unknown) live mainly in the steppe between the lower Kuma and Terek rivers, south of the mouth of the Terek adjoining Kumuk territory, and on the right bank of the Kuban north of Cherkessk. They probably reached their habitat at the same time as the Kumuk.

(e, f.) Until 1943 the Karachay and Balkar (respectively ca. 76,000 and 43,000) lived on the northern slopes of the Great Caucasus, the former along the headwaters of the Kuban,

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Adige] Caucasia RH1

that Russia would not fight for the barren Caucasus mountains if she were really as great and mighty as was sometimes asserted by some mountaineers who had seen her immensity and later returned to their own people.[1]

THE FIRST EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

The mountaineers of the Western Caucasus – the Circassians or the Adyge – who had lived close to the shores of the Black Sea, occupied particularly important strategic positions. In every war which Russia waged against Turkey the fearless Circassians had constituted a grave menace in the immediate rear of the Russian Caucasus front. The alternatives, from the Russian point of view, therefore, could only be either the total surrender or the total annihilation of the Circassians. As only a minority of the Circassians were ready to accept surrender, a mass migration of the Circassians to Turkey appeared the only possible 'solution', both to the Russian conquerors and the Circassians themselves, whose indomitable spirit of freedom could not be reconciled with Russian rule.

Thus between 1861 and 1864 about 500,000 Circassians left the Caucasus; but owing to starvation, disease and the hardships of the journey in overcrowded vessels, it is said that only half of them ever reached Turkey alive. Referring to this trek of the Circassians a semi-official Russian publication admitted that 'a calamity of such proportions has rarely befallen humanity'.[2] This great exodus of the Circassians disposed of the problem of nationalities in large areas of the western part of the North Caucasus region and opened them up to Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian colonization.

After the departure of the Circassians a great deal still remained to be done in the North Caucasus region from a Russian national point of view. Although thousands of Chechens, Nogai Tartars and Ossetins had likewise participated in the great exodus, these and other peoples of the Central and Eastern Caucasus continued to be a source of uneasiness to the Russian State. Complete Russian victory over the rebellious mountaineers was achieved only under the Soviet régime.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS IN THE SOVIET CAUCASUS

The Russian communist leaders came to the Northern Caucasus with progressive ideas and plans for raising the material and cultural level of its peoples. The Soviet Government was originally even determined to give the small mountain peoples a chance to combine their forces and thus become a political factor of some importance. In accordance with the wishes of the more advanced mountaineers the Soviet Government decided that there should be one United Northern Caucasus

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
[Chechen] Caucasia RH1

describing them as the 'most active and strongest opponents of the Czarist Government during the conquest of the Caucasus'. The Russians suffered extensive and costly disasters at the hands of this people, who were unequalled in forest warfare.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the Chechens have challenged the Russian Empire, but from 1818 onwards their resistance to Russian rule assumed major proportions. In that year General Yermolov built a fortress to subjugate more easily the land of the Chechens. He called the new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. The name of Grozny had a deeper meaning than might appear at the first glance: it was the symbol of a political programme that Yermolov defined in the following words: 'I wish that the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Grozny became Yermolov's headquarters, and it was from Grozny that countless Russian expeditions set out 'to punish raiders, avenge defeats, establish new posts, relieve beleaguered garrisons, or rescue retreating bands and armies'.[4] The Russian campaign against Chechenia reached its climax in 1840, at the time of the great Chechen rising under the leadership of Imam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movement led to the gradual submission of the Chechens in the years 1857-59.

The Russian authorities knew well that these new subjects of the Czar, after all the trouble they had caused, would not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom; so an attempt was made to settle the 'Chechen problem' by a double transfer of population. Immediately after the conquest the inhabitants of forty-four auls (mountain villages) were transplanted from the mountains to the plains, where they could more easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were forced to emigrate to Turkey, where they were given hospitality on the express demand of the Russian Government. In the summer of 1865, 39,000 Chechens, one-fifth of the entire Chechen population at that date, left Russia. Those who stayed behind did not remain quiescent. In 1877 there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, and more trouble in 1886. A Russian monograph on the Chechens, published in 1894, said that they could not yet be considered 'fully pacified'; they still looked across the border to Turkey whither many more dreamed of emigrating.[5] The emigration of the 39,000 had not eliminated the 'Chechen problem', for the birthrate of these Chechens was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

CHECHEN-INGUSH MOSLEM OPPOSITION

The immediate consequence of the October Revolution in Chechenia was a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the

ment on 'serious shortcomings and mistakes' committed in Kabarda in the field of national policy. It stressed that conditions in Kabardinian education were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., which stipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schools in their own language.

Although the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advanced than the peoples of the Soviet Far North, they suffer from the same acute shortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to the national culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948, the Kabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-six Kabardinians out of a total of 559 students.[17]

It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian culture and Kabardinian language will become even more remote with the increasing pressure of Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alone the number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. more than doubled; it increased from about 37,000 to 93,000. This increase was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion in Kabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932. After the war the numerical relation between 'natives' and colonists changed to the detriment of the former, owing to the forcible departure of the Balkars.[1] Moreover more Russian colonists came into the country to staff new factories springing up around Nalchik.

[1] [Cf. category 131, p. 193 - - Analyst]

THE CIRCASSIANS – A RESERVE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people,[2] the Soviet Government set up two Autonomous Provinces in the western part of the North Caucasus area; the Cherkess Province in the Caucasus foothills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.

Surrounded as they are on all sides by Russian territories these two national units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies in particular to the Adyge Province, whose capital – Maikop – used to be the third largest Russian oil centre after Baku and Grozny, before the development of the 'second Baku' between the Volga and the Urals.

Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, which had a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55·7 per cent various branches of Adyge, 42·7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and the rest made up of other Europeans and Armenians). The size of the Province was increased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus found themselves in the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Province won doubtful 'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentage of disfranchized people. This was due to the arbitrary action of the local Soviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of 'kulak', 'capitalist' and 'reactionary' with the result that 12 per cent of the entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights. — [2] [Cf. CAT. 116, p. 182/11 Sov. Union-Analyst]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Cherkess] Caucasia RH1
Daghestan RH8

entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights.

The Circassian (Cherkess) Autonomous Province is inhabited by three small Northern Caucasus peoples – the Cherkess, the Nogai Tartars and the Abazintsy, apart from Slav colonists. In 1933 the three indigenous peoples had a narrow aggregate majority over the Russians and Ukrainians.

Although the Circassians, as a people, have no political future in Soviet Russia itself, they may still be of service to the Soviet diplomacy. There are Circassians living in Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan. They are all descendants of the very Circassians whom the Czarist authorities forced to leave Russia in the sixties of the nineteenth century. In Turkey the Circassians have largely become one with the Turkish people, but in the Arab countries they still form distinct communities. In Palestine they have kept to their own customs and language, and do not inter-marry with the Arabs. The Syrian Arabs dislike the Circassians, of whom both Turks and French had made use against the indigenous population of the country. In Transjordan, too, the Circassian minority has preserved its individuality.[18]

The survival of Circassian national sentiments in Syria, Palestine and Transjordan may tempt the Soviet Union to create a 'Circassian problem'. Soviet propaganda may try at a given moment to arouse interest for the 'old country' among the Circassians in the Arab world. It should not be too difficult for Russia to spread among the Middle Eastern Circassians the story of the rebirth of the Circassian people in the U.S.S.R., and of the existence of 'Circassian States' therein. Having done this preparatory work Russia may either encourage Circassian re-immigration into the Caucasus or she may use the Circassian on the spot as one of several trump cards Russian imperialism holds in reserve in the Middle East.

RUSSIA'S MOST POLYGLOT COLONY: DAGHESTAN

Daghestan represents the most difficult problem which the Soviet nationalities policy has to face, not only in the Caucasus, but in the Soviet Union as a whole. The very name of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. indicates that the country occupies a special position in the U.S.S.R. It is the only Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which does not bear the name of a people but of a territory.

Daghestan is one of the most polyglot countries of the world. Ethnologists record that its roughly 1,000,000 inhabitants are split up into thirty-two nationalities, in a territory of only 14,600 square miles.* The

* In its original form Daghestan covered 19,800 square miles. In 1938 the Soviet Government separated from Daghestan parts of its lowlands with their predominant Ukrainian-Russian population, and its territory was thus reduced to about 13,000 square miles. After the war, Daghestan 'inherited' from Chechenia 1,600 square miles.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced.

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Many 'Soviet Assyrians' disliked the anti-religious policy of the Bolsheviks, the continuous experiments which the Soviet authorities made with Assyrian cultural life, as well as the entire communist social system. A large number of Assyrians therefore left Russia for Iraq in the period between the wars to join the Assyrian levies under British command.

During and after the Second World War Soviet Russian power politics made use of the Assyrians of Northern Persia. Although their number was small Soviet occupation authorities mobilized them, together with local Armenians, in support of the pro-Russian autonomous régime established in Tabriz. After the withdrawal of the Red Army troops the Persian Assyrians suffered together with all other groups of the population in whom the Russians had shown particular interest.

RUSSIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

The small number of Assyrians in Middle Eastern countries (30,000 in Iraq, 9,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Persia) indicates that Russia coulduse them only for very limited purposes. The Kurds may become a more redoubtable instrument in Russian hands. They are one of the most important factors in the Middle East. How many Kurds are there altogether? This purely statistical question is in itself part of the 'Kurdish problem'. In Turkey, for instance, official data referring to 1945 say that their number in that country does not exceed 1,900,000, but sources more favourable to the Kurdish national point of view speak of 4,000,000 Turkish Kurds. It is significant that this latter figure is approvingly quoted in a Russian monograph on Turkey.[53] In addition, there are 800,000 Kurds in Iraq, 700,000 in Persia and 200,000 in Syria.

K. 161

S.U. 563 648

The four States with a Kurdish population are bound to draw closer to each other for military, geographical, political and economic reasons. The Kurdish question common to all of them to a greater or lesser degree may prove to cement their unity. Russia's interests are the exact opposite of those of the four Middle Eastern countries with Kurdish minorities. Russia is a bitter opponent of any kind of federation on her borders. What she wants is not Kurdish cement but Kurdish dynamite.

For a long time Soviet Russia had had no real Kurdish policy. The strength of Britain in the Middle East prevented both the Soviet Government and the Comintern from playing the Kurdish card. In Russian communist eyes the Kurds were but a 'counter-revolutionary force', a tool of British imperialism intended to embarrass Turkey, the Arab world and even the Soviet Union itself.

But even at the time when leading Soviet quarters still held this negative view on the Kurds, they envisaged the possibility of a change in the